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This paper attempts to detect the objectives of different sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) 
and to find clues to their investment strategies across different types of firms and their locations 
by utilizing available data on the individual transactions of different SWFs. We explore the 
extent to which and how the investment strategies embedded in SWF transactions by Middle 
East and North African (MENA) countries are related to their scores on the well-known 
Linaburg-Maduell (LM) index of SWF transparency and quality, the age and size of the assets 
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I. Introduction and Background 
The last decade has brought about major shifts in the global financial landscape. One of 
the most significant, and often overlooked, trends is the rise of sovereign wealth funds (SWFs), 
especially those in Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. SWFs can enable sponsoring 
countries to shift from an often extremely heavy reliance on rents obtained from nonrenewable 
resources to a more diversified portfolio of financial and physical capital—partly in their own 
countries, but largely abroad. By investing heavily through their SWFs in this way, oil and other 
natural resource exporting countries can avoid the natural resource curse that is bound to result in 
the long run if they are not living up to Hartwick’s Rule.1  
There are many different, and often competing, objectives that can be addressed by SWFs 
in making their investments. One such objective is to avert the uncertainty of widely fluctuating 
oil prices, and possible environmental or conflict risks which could affect a country's ability to 
export natural resources. Other possible objectives of SWFs include saving for future generations 
after oil reserves are depleted and developing relationships with firms and industries which may 
eventually be interested in investing in the country. The latter objective could, in turn, allow 
individuals or firms in these countries to learn advanced technologies and to develop links to 
value chains that could foster diversification from oil, and to promote the development of human 
and physical capital. In the context of such links, not only would the sectors or functional types 
of those investments matter, but also their geographical pattern.  
While much of the sovereign wealth fund boom has occurred only over the last two 
decades, some SWFs have been around for half a century. The first SWF, the Kuwait Investment 
Board (KIB), originated in Kuwait in 1953 while it was still a British Protectorate (prior to its 
independence). This formed the basis of today’s Kuwait Investment Authority (KIA).1 Since 
then, many countries across the globe, from Papua New Guinea to Norway, have created 
sovereign wealth funds. Some countries, like the United Arab Emirates, have opened multiple 
funds. It is worth noting that, while all the GCC funds were established from the revenues 
derived from exporting oil, some countries’ funds (such as those of Singapore and China), are 
                                                
1 Hartwick’s Rule states that, because oil exports involve the sale of a country’s wealth, to avoid lowering its future 
wealth it would have to use almost all the proceeds of its exports to invest in its human and physical capital stock 
and financial assets. 
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not commodity-based and others, like those of Chile, Peru and Botswana, are based on copper, 
diamonds, or other minerals rather than oil. 
SWFs came under scrutiny in 2007-8 due in large part to the rapid growth in their assets 
after 2000, and the role that many of these funds played in the financial markets of Western 
nations during and after the 2007 financial crisis. Arab SWFs were major investors in U.S. banks 
when liquidity was vital. Many public figures in the U.S. and elsewhere expressed fear and 
distrust regarding the nature of the funds’ investments2. With so little information available on 
the workings of these large funds, officials in various countries around the world suspected that 
SWFs may have been driven by political motives. Some believed that crucial segments of the 
U.S. and other Western economies would be bought up by these secretive foreign investors, with 
independent agendas capable of undermining the security and integrity of their economies. 
This distrust of the secretive SWFs from the Middle East led to threats that serious 
barriers would be imposed on their ability to continue making investments in Western financial 
institutions as Westerners questioned whether there were any ulterior motives behind these 
investments. These misgivings gave rise to the development of an international association of 
SWFs, and to the creation of various indexes measuring the overall degree of transparency and 
managerial quality in the operation of SWFs. Opening their operations up to public scrutiny and 
earning acceptable scores on these indexes was intended to promote continued access by more 
transparent SWFs to financial markets and success in their investments. Table 1 provides a list of 
the most notable SWFs in the world, and the evolution of their assets between the years 2008 and 
2016.  
As can easily be seen in Table 1, quite a few of these funds come from the Middle East 
and North Africa (MENA) region. Some, like Algeria’s Revenue Regulation Fund (RRF), 
Bahrain’s Mumtalakat, the Development Fund for Iraq, the Libyan Investment Authority (LIA), 
and two UAE SWFs (the UAE’s Ras Al Khaimeh and the Federal Emirates Investment 
Authority), have shown little growth in their assets. Yet, many of the others from this region, 
including Kuwait’s aforementioned KIA, Iran’s National Development Fund for Iran, Oman’s 
State General Reserve Fund (SGRF), Qatar’s Qatar Investment Authority (QIA), Saudi Arabia’s 
SAMA and Petroleum Investment Fund (PIF), and various other funds from the UAE, have been 
among the most rapidly growing SWFs over the 2008-2016 period.  
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Table 2 provides the scores over the period 2008-2016 on the best known and most up-to-
date index for evaluating the transparency of SWFs over time: the Linaburg-Maduell (LM) 
Index, supported by the Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute. Consistent with the suspicions from 
around the world regarding MENA’s SWFs, one can see that, overall, MENA funds scored 
poorly on this index (especially in the earlier years). Libya’s LIA, Qatar’s QIA, Algeria’s RRF, 
and UAE’s Federal Emirates Investment Authority all had minimum scores of 1 on this 10-point 
scale. Meanwhile, Oman’s SGRF received a score of 2, compared with scores of 6 for Kuwait’s 
KIA, 7 for Bahrain’s Mumtalakat and for Singapore’s Temasek, 9 for Azerbaijan’s SWF, and 10 
for Norway’s SWF. While the correlation is far from perfect, by comparing the changes over 
time in SWF asset accumulation in Table 1 with those in the LM indexes in Table 2 for the same 
SWFs, one should note that the MENA SWFs in which the LM scores improved were generally 
also ones with more rapidly growing assets. 
 Yet, despite asset growth, and in several cases of increasing transparency represented by 
improving LM scores, MENA SWFs predominately scored below SWFs in many other countries 
on the LM index. Several of the MENA countries hosting SWFs are far from democratic, lacking 
freedom of speech and of the press and with relatively weak governance institutions. The 
citizenry in countries hosting these MENA SWFs often have very little information about their 
objectives and workings. While many of these funds now have websites, the information 
available is often quite limited. Much of the literature on SWFs in MENA countries is based on 
special interviews with SWF managers that may have been conducted by scholars or business 
newspaper journalists. Additionally, a good deal of that literature derives from rather special 
(and not necessarily representative) cases that have made newspaper headlines—either because 
of the large size of their investments, or because of political scandals.  
As the title suggests, the purpose of this paper is to utilize the available data on the 
individual transactions of different SWFs—especially those in MENA countries. Our intent is to 
more properly detect the objectives of different SWFs, and perhaps changes therein over time, 
and to find clues to their investment strategies across different types of firms and their locations. 
We explore the extent to which, and how, the investment strategies embedded in these 
transactions by the SWFs are related to their LM scores, or to the size of the assets owned by the 
fund, the age of the fund, the composition of their board members, or other key fund officials. 
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We also examine the magnitudes of the individual transactions related to the purposes of the 
investments and their geographic allocation. 
Our presentation is organized as follows: Section II provides a brief review of the most 
relevant existing literature. Section III describes how the transaction data was put together and 
identifies the most important SWF and country characteristics included, as well as the sources of 
such data. It also identifies the key relationships to be estimated empirically. Section IV 
identifies the models and estimation techniques and presents the empirical results for each of 
three different types of outcomes: geographic allocation of investments, the functional 
(investment type) allocations of these investments, and the relative magnitudes of the 
investments made in the transactions. Section V concludes with suggestions for further research 
and some possible policy implications. 
 
II Relevant Literature 
The existing literature on SWFs, even on funds in specific regions like the GCC and 
elsewhere in the MENA region, is quite diverse. It is widely noted that, because of their greater 
secrecy, research on GCC and other MENA SWFs is far more limited than that of other SWFs. 
Given the pervasive secrecy of Arab SWFs prior to 2007, some of the literature has been devoted 
to the construction and interpretation of transparency and institutional indexes across SWFs and 
over time (e.g., Truman 2010, and Stone and Truman 2013). Another track in the literature 
addressing SWFs in the MENA region consists of broad economic and political economy 
surveys of SWFs and changes over time, i.e., from their origins, through the rise and fall of oil 
prices to their confrontations with Western governments in the aftermath of the world financial 
crisis of 2008, and the Arab Spring and its aftermath. See Bazoobandi and Nugent (2017) and the 
many related references.  
Still another track in the existing literature has concentrated on the optimal design of 
SWF portfolios needed to deal with the specific risk problems that oil-exporting countries face 
because of oil price volatility, the possibility of environmental shocks, different population sizes, 
and estimated oil reserves (e.g., Cheasty and Villafuerte 2017). Aizenman and Glick (2008) 
initiated a branch of literature that concerns the extent to which the existence of an SWF in an oil 
exporting country can actually reduce these risks and raise that country’s economic growth rates. 
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An important and recent example of this is Mohaddes and Raissi (2017) who, based on a sample 
of 60 commodity exporting countries over the period 1981-2014, shows strong evidence that 
these countries generally have been successful, though certainly not always to the same extent. 
The literature underscores the importance of understanding the operations of SWFs and how and 
why their outcomes differ. 
 The two papers most closely related to this study are Arouri, Boubaker and Grais (2018) 
and Elbadawi, Soto and Zaki (2018). The former study focuses on a sample of 223 firms listed 
on stock exchanges that were targeted by Arab and non-Arab SWFs over the period 2000-2014. 
By comparing the firm and country characteristics of the 73 companies targeted by Arab SWFs 
with those of other firms targeted by non-Arab SWFs, the authors draw certain, at least tentative, 
conclusions about differences in the motives and investment strategies between the two sets of 
SWFs. In particular, they find that the Arab SWFs invest in firms that are larger, more strategic 
in nature, and located in countries with less corruption, better developed stock markets, higher 
economic growth, and which often were their former colonial powers. The firms they invest in, 
however, are not as profitable, and offer less in the way of liquidity and dividend payouts than 
those invested in by non-Arab SWFs. The authors attribute these differences to the focus of Arab 
SWFs on safety and strategic value rather than on profitability and liquidity.  
 Interestingly, the second of these very recent and closely related studies, that by 
Elbadawi, Soto and Zaki (2018), uses a quite different methodology but arrives at some similar 
conclusions. The authors make use of SWF transactions undertaken by 28 different SWFs into 
102 home and destination countries over the period 2005-2015. Based on the notion that (as in 
trade models) the informational and other costs of making investments outside the SWFs’ home 
country would be lower for nearby countries and the advantages greater in countries with large 
GDPs, Elbadawi et al. (2018) use a gravity model to explain both the pattern and magnitudes of 
these investments from host SWFs to destination countries. Another rationale for using the 
gravity model is that, with exceptions such as Russia (where its SWF is not permitted to invest 
outside the country), most SWFs make the majority of their investments outside their borders, 
primarily in the form of FDI. The authors’ analysis is also motivated by their observations of 
descriptive statistics that Arab countries receive much less in the way of cross-border SWF 
investments than would be expected based on proximity, common language, and other 
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similarities (even from SWFs located nearby). The Elbadawi et al. model includes not only 
distance, common language, GDP size, and relative lending rates in the origin and destination 
countries, but also institutional indexes in the destination country. 
The studies’ results show that, as expected, the size of GDP at destination relative to that 
at origin is found to have a significant positive effect on these cross-border SWF investments. 
Contrary to what would be expected in the case of trade, the authors find that distance tends to 
have a positive effect on such investments, a finding they attribute to the fact that FDI flows are 
essentially substitutes for trade flows.2 While an Arab dummy for destination country has a 
positive effect on the likelihood of receiving a cross-border investment, it has a negative effect 
on the value of these investments, confirming the paradox. From the results of their extended 
model that include some general country-level institutional measures from the World Bank, 
Elbadawi et al. attribute this paradoxical finding to the weakness of governance and other 
institutions in most Arab investment receiving countries. The UAE and Qatar are among the few 
MENA countries with relatively high quality governance institutions, such as government 
effectiveness and freedom from corruption, which have attracted more SWF investments than 
most other Arab countries. 
 To complement some of the studies cited in this section, our analysis also focuses on the 
transaction-based investments of SWFs and includes information about the sizes and destinations 
of these transactions, not only in terms of geography, but also in terms of function (investment 
type). Furthermore, our study brings institutional indexes into the analysis yet, since the key 
decision makers are the investing SWFs, our focus is on the institutional quality and other 
characteristics of the SWF itself. Given the aforementioned comparative secrecy of Arab and 
MENA SWFs, the study focuses on SWF transparency (as captured by LM index). In view of the 
political economy literature concerning the quite distinct histories of the different Arab SWFs, 
we also pay more attention to the specific differences in investment patterns between these 
funds. Moreover, we have deemed it important to identify the many of the characteristics of 
these investments, such as the number of acquirers involved.  
 
                                                
2 We would alert the reader, however, to the fact that another reason why both trade and financial investments 
among neighboring Arab countries is much less than would be predicted by gravity models is the lack of resource 
complementarity and the similarity in their production structures.  
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III. Data, Their Sources and the Relationships to be Investigated 
Collecting data on SWF fund transactions for this purpose is not a straightforward 
process in as much as we found considerable inconsistency in the reports of the magnitude of 
these transactions. Additionally, there is no one comprehensive transaction database 
encompassing all of a SWF’s transactions. These issues induced us to consult multiple sources of 
transactions data: Reuters’ Thomson One, Bureau Van Dijk’s Zephyr, and the Sovereign Wealth 
Fund Institute (SWFI) transaction databases. From these sources, we have worked to identify the 
size of each transaction (in millions of dollars), the percentage of the target company acquired, 
the industry and region of the target company, and whether the deal involved more than one 
acquirer. 
While, for some SWFs, the relevant transaction data is available beginning in the late 
1990s, since the information on such transactions for these early years was often quite 
incomplete and seldom verifiable from a second source, in this paper we focus exclusively on 
transactions from 2007 onwards. From the starting dates of all SWFs under study indicated in 
Table 1 (and for convenience again in Table 2), one can see that quite a few of the relevant 
SWFs were initiated only after 2007, once again justifying our focus on SWF transactions 
beginning in that year. All the fund-specific data, including creation dates, the time path of assets 
under management, and LM transparency ratings over time, were taken from the Sovereign 
Wealth Fund Institute (SWFI). In so far as possible, additional information on the key 
individuals involved in the funds has been taken from the funds’ websites, as well as LinkedIn, 
and Bloomberg. Lastly, country-specific data, such as GDP per capita and natural resource rents 
as a percentage of GDP, were taken from the World Bank’s website. 
 Even when the transaction data could be obtained from more than one source, reconciling 
the data from different sources on transaction sizes and percentages acquired posed a challenge 
since each database collects and presents the data differently. For example, while Thomson One 
and the SWFI record the values attributed to a specific sovereign wealth fund, Zephyr records the 
total transaction value. These discrepancies were common and important because a large portion 
of the total number of transactions analyzed involved multiple acquirers (in the form of joint 
venture deals). 
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To address this lack of uniformity, we relied heavily on data from the SWFI and 
Thomson One databases for which, as indicated above, the data is most consistent. When data for 
a specific SWF transaction was unavailable from both sources, the figures on the total 
transaction values and on the percentages acquired by different acquirers participating in the deal 
were used to establish a more realistic and comparable transaction value attributable to the 
specific SWF involved. Data collection on the individuals involved in fund transactions posed 
additional challenges since, unfortunately, the SWF websites rarely list all the key employees 
working at the funds and seldom identify past employees. 
For our dependent variables we first focus on the way in which the SWFs chose to 
allocate their investments geographically by aggregating them into the following areas: Western 
(defined to include both Europe and North America), Asia (all countries in Asia), LAC and SSA 
(all countries in the Latin American, Caribbean, and Sub-Saharan Africa regions), and MENA 
(Middle East and North Africa). Second, we distinguish SWF investment allocations by the 
sectoral or functional patterns by identifying Strategic (encompassing aerospace, technology, and 
telecommunications), Social (health care and education), Industry (including industrial materials, 
industrial products, and automotive), Technology, and Finance. Third, we seek to explain the 
relative magnitudes of the different transactional investments either in absolute terms (in natural 
logs) or relative to the size of the SWF measured by their total assets under management at the 
time of that transaction (Value per AUM). 
 As prompted by the questions raised in some of the literature, throughout our analysis we 
make use of the total value of assets under the management (AUM) of each SWF and the identity 
of each of the SWFs for each of the GCC funds (including ADIA, KIA, SAMA, IPIC, QIA, and 
MUBAD, the full names of which can be identified in Tables 1 and 2), as well as those from 
outside the GCC, including Singapore’s Temasek Holdings (TEMASEK). It is worth noting that 
Singapore’s Temasek Holdings served as the template for Bahrain’s Mumtalakat. For our 
measure of SWF institutional quality, we make use of the transparency index constructed by 
Linaburg and Maduell (LM), with data obtained from the Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute’s 
website. In so far as possible, we include information over the period 2007-2016 for each of the 
following measures: 
● Age: the age of the fund in years 
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● AUM: Assets Under Management as a measure of SWF size  
● LM: Linaburg-Maduell Transparency Index. Measure of transparency from 0 to 10 
● MA: a dummy variable for a transaction involving multiple acquirers  
● TIME: a time trend starting from 1 in 2007 
● Relative Size: size of the transaction relative to the fund’s assets under management 
● ADIA, IPIC, Dubai_World, SAMA, PIF, ADIC, OIF, EIA, ICD, Mumtalakat, KIA, 
Mubadala, SGRF, GCC (an aggregate representing SWFs in the GCC region): dummy 
variables for the SWF involved in the transaction 
● IP and CORR: International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) indexes representing investment 
profile and control of corruption, respectively 
● Dummy variables for Royalty, Family or Foreigner: dummy variables for MENA SWFs 
with a minimum threshold percentage of their board of directors or other key decision-
making committees which come from the royal family, other elite families, or foreigners, 
respectively 
● As noted below, we also include some interaction terms between TIME and other 
variables, such as individual SWF dummy variables, to evaluate whether the funds 
significantly changed their behavior and allocations over time 
 
IV. Models and Empirical Estimates 
As indicated above, our empirical analysis focuses on three different relationships. The 
first two capture the allocation of SWF investments reflected in the individual transactions 
geographically, and by investment function or sector. The last characteristic reflects the form in 
which these investments are made, namely, their relative size and whether or not they are in the 
form of joint ventures with other acquirers. 
In the first two cases, since the investment is to a specific country or region and in a 
particular sector of function type, the dependent variables Yijt are dummy (0,1) variables and the 
relationships estimated by logit regressions of the following type:  
Yijt = β0 + β1(SWF Characteristics)i + β2(SWF Identity)i + β3(Destination)j + εijt (1)  
where the subscript i refers to the SWF making the investment, j represents the country (or 
region) of destination or alternative sector of function type in which it is made, and t refers to the 
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year in which the investment is made. εijt represents the random error term, and the βs are the 
parameters to be estimated. In the latter case, where the dependent variable represents the 
magnitude of the investment, the destinations themselves j, either geographic or functional could 
serve as key explanatory variables. 
Table 3 presents the logistic regression results for the geographic allocations, where the 
individual countries of destination are aggregated into four different groups: Western, Asian, 
LAC and SSA, and MENA. The explanatory variables include four important characteristics of 
the investing SWF, namely, size (measured by AUM, as defined above), a dummy for GCC if 
the SWF belongs to a GCC country, Age, and the LM Transparency score. Also included is a 
dummy variable if there are multiple acquirers in the transaction (MA) and, in some of the 
columns of the table, for individual SWFs such as ADIA, KIA, etc. The latter dummies cannot 
be included among the determinants for investments in LAC and SSA because of the small 
numbers of SWF investments made with destinations in such countries.  
From the column 1 results for Western Countries, the following findings are clear and 
statistically highly significant. While neither the size of the SWF fund nor its age has a 
significant effect on investment in Western countries, having a higher LM index makes it more 
likely that the SWF will invest in the West. Note also that, when multiple acquirers are involved, 
the investment is less likely to be in the West. SWFs from the GCC are also seen to be much 
more likely to invest in Western countries after controlling for the aforementioned factors. In 
columns 2 and 3 when some individual SWF dummy variables are included (several of which are 
among the largest in the GCC region), the GCC origin dummy loses its significance, but the 
coefficients of ADIA and KIA are even larger and positive. These positive coefficients are 
greater in column 3 when interactions of these SWFs with TIME are added. The latter interaction 
terms are negative, indicating that this preference for investing in firms in the West is declining 
somewhat over time.  
Exactly the opposite pattern is observed for Saudi Arabia’s SWF, SAMA. As indicated in 
Table 2, it can be seen that the LM scores for ADIA and KIA were among the highest for SWFs 
in the GCC in recent years. The results in both columns support the proposition that greater 
transparency facilitates investments by SWFs in Western countries. This may be explained by 
the fact that firms and financial markets in the West would be more willing to accept SWF 
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investments when they can be certified to be more transparent, possibly serving as a positive 
signal to other investors.3  
From the corresponding results for investments in Asian countries in columns 4-6, one 
can see that many of the coefficients of the fund characteristics are very different from, and often 
opposite of, what they were for investments in Western countries in columns 1-3 of the table. 
The size and age of the funds are more likely to have positive and significant effects on the 
likelihood of investments in Asia. SWFs from GCC countries (or, alternatively, ADIA and KIA) 
are seen to have been less likely (and SAMA more likely) to invest in Asia. Higher LM 
transparency scores make these funds less likely to invest in Asia. This may be attributed to the 
smaller significance of transparency (measured by the LM index) in Asia. Additionally, the large 
Asian countries were the most important alternative destinations for SWF investments to the 
West. One should also recall that, as discussed in much of the literature on SWF transparency, it 
was the West (not Asia) which had been the focus of the world financial crisis of 2007-8. 
Investments in the West are especially controversial due to fears over the motivates of these 
secretive Arab SWFs. The positive relationship between the Multiple Acquirer dummy and 
investment destinations in Asia, visible from columns 4-6, might be an indication that such 
investments may be riskier, and the financial market and dispute resolution mechanisms less well 
developed in Asia than in the West. If so, this could be an indication that participation in joint 
ventures is a means of sharing the risk and taking advantage of the knowledge of one’s investing 
partner.  
The transactions for the other two regions are less frequent, especially in the case of the 
LAC and SSA region. As shown in column 7, the younger SWFs seem to be more inclined to 
invest in this region, and SWF transparency seems to have a positive influence. For MENA 
region transactions, the correlation matrix reveals an unusually high correlation between Age of 
Fund and AUM. For that reason, Age of Fund is omitted from the specification in column 8 for 
the MENA region (though not from column 9) and, instead, TIME is included in the preferred 
specification of column 8. Note that it is the smaller funds and those with lower LM scores 
which invest more heavily in the MENA region. Over time, however, as MENA’s GDP grew 
                                                
3 Truman (2010) and others point to the possible existence of such a signaling effect as one rationale for creating the 
SWF Institute, promoting the LM and other indexes of SWF transparency and inducing SWFs from the Gulf and 
elsewhere to join the SWFI. 
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rapidly and political uncertainty arose from the Arab Spring events, MENA (and, especially, 
GCC countries) became anxious to attract SWF and other investments. Not surprisingly, the 
coefficient of TIME in column 8 is positive and significant. As in the Asian countries, LM seems 
to be negatively related to investment transactions in MENA. Having multiple acquirers to help 
conduct due diligence of acquisition targets, share the risk, and, ultimately, co-manage target 
firms seems unimportant in MENA. Because such a large percentage of the investments in 
MENA is made by GCC SWFs, a coefficient for this variable cannot be estimated.  
Table 4 presents the corresponding results for the allocations of SWF Investments by 
Type and Function, making use of three SWF characteristics: Age, LM Transparency, and 
Transaction Value relative to total SWF Fund assets (AUM). Where possible, dummy variables 
for some of the same large SWFs are used (as in Table 3).  
By comparing the coefficients of each row across the different Investment Types or 
Functions indicated in the different columns of the table, one can see that older funds are more 
likely to have invested in Technology, Strategic and, to a lesser extent, Industry functions. This 
is not the case in Social or Finance functions and sectors. Funds with greater transparency 
(higher LM scores) are more likely to invest in firms serving Social functions. To invest in 
Strategic or Industrial sectors, it appears that the transaction values relative to AUM need to be 
somewhat larger than in other types of functions. Such a tendency is often attributed to the fact 
that the investing SWFs may want to make larger investments to allow one of their officers to 
become a board member in order to gain more influence over the target company. In each 
functional type, there appears to be one individual SWF among those identified which is more or 
less inclined to invest in that function type than other SWFs. KIA (which is known to be more 
conservative in its investments, with a diverse portfolio containing various smaller stakes in 
companies) is less likely to invest in Strategic and Technology functions. By contrast, ADIA is 
more likely to invest in Industry, and the non-GCC SWF, Temasek, is more likely to invest in 
Finance.  
The low Pseudo R2 values in all columns of the table indicate considerable room for 
improvement in generating solid explanations for the distribution of SWF investments by 
function type. In an attempt to delve a little deeper for the somewhat smaller sample of 
transactions that are aimed at the GCC countries only, we replace the SWF specific dummy 
Topics in Middle Eastern and African Economies 
Proceedings of Middle East Economic Association 
Vol. 21, Issue No. 1, May 2019  
 
14 
 
variables in columns 6 to 8 with the dummy variables for Royalty, Family, and Foreigner when 
the numbers of important persons administering the SWFs exceed certain minimum thresholds 
that could have certain influences on the where and what these funds invest in. The results do 
show a number of these dummy variables to be significantly related to different Investment 
Types. For SWFs with above threshold numbers of elite family members, investments in Social 
and Industry types are more likely, while those with above threshold numbers of foreigners are 
less likely to invest in Social, Industry and Technology sectors. While these results are 
supportive of the hypothesis that such investment allocations may be related to the compositions 
of the boards and other key decision makers of the SWFs, their inclusion seems to add little to 
the explanatory power of the models.  
In Table 5 we revisit the geographic allocations of Table 3 to the MENA countries and 
the functional allocations within MENA, without distinguishing the individual SWFs. Two 
destination country level institutional indicators used by Elbadawi et al. (2018), the Investment 
Profile and Corruption indexes of the ICRG, are used in Table 5. Unlike Elbadawi et al. (2018), 
we make use of both country-level and governance indexes and the SWF-level LM index in this 
table. The results in columns 1 and 2 show, as before, that larger fund size and the passage of 
time have contributed to larger probabilities of SWFs investing in MENA countries, and that 
such investments are less likely when in the form of joint ventures (MA). The addition of 
Investment Profile and Corruption indexes shows that intuitional measures are also important. As 
before, investments in MENA countries are typically made by SWFs with lower LM scores. The 
investments of SWFs with high LM scores are skewed to countries where high LM scores are 
more meaningful (Western countries). Higher scores in column 1 on the Investment Profile Index 
in a destination MENA does not significantly increase the probability of a MENA country 
receiving an SWF investment. Conversely, higher scores on the Corruption Index in column 2 
increases the probability of investment significantly, but only at the 10 percent level.  
The remaining columns of the table show the relationships between the same set of 
explanatory variables. Here we use Relative Size of the Transaction (its value relative to the 
fund’s AUM) and the Age of the SWF instead of MA. By comparing coefficients across the 
different pairs of columns, it can be observed that large investment transactions and investments 
made by older SWFs are more likely to be made in Strategic and Industrial industries. 
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Destination countries with higher scores on the Investment Profile Index appear more likely to 
receive investments in Strategic Sectors, but less likely to receive investments in Industrial 
Sectors. Countries with higher scores on the Corruption Index are also likely to attract 
investments in Strategic sectors, but not investments in other sectors.  
Table 6 presents the empirical results for the absolute size of individual investment 
transactions measured by the value of the investment (in natural logs) made by that SWF. A full 
list of explanatory variables is included: the size (AUM), Age, and LM of the SWF; the MA 
dummy; the GCC dummy; dummy variables for each of the five investment function types; and 
dummy variables for the same individual SWFs investigated in Tables 3 and 4. As can easily be 
seen, the effects of Age and LM are negative, while those of AUM and MA are positive and 
highly significant. Investments whose functions are Social and Finance are associated with 
individual investments that are larger, while those for Industry and, to a lesser extent, 
Technology tend to be smaller. After controlling for all these factors, the coefficients of FGCC 
and many of the individual SWFs are not statistically significant. Investments made by ADIA, 
however, tend to be smaller and those of TEMASEK and IPIC tend to be larger than otherwise 
predicted.  
 
V. Conclusion 
When viewed collectively, we believe the table results identify a number of behavioral 
patterns of GCC SWFs, though certainly not in terms of identifying causal relationships. In 
Tables 1 and 2 we demonstrate the relatively large number of SWFs in MENA countries and, 
especially, in the GCC. In several cases, particularly the UAE and even within the individual 
emirate of Abu Dhabi, there are several different SWFs within a single country. The SWFs vary 
greatly in size, with Abu Dhabi’s ADIA, Saudi Arabia’s SAMA, and Kuwait’s KIA among the 
largest in the world, while several UAE SWFs are among the smallest in the world. These funds 
also vary considerably to the extent that they have taken up membership in the Sovereign Wealth 
Institute, become more transparent (as exemplified by attaining relatively high scores on the LM 
Index), and adopted best practice standards similar to those of Norway, whose fund is widely 
praised for its transparency. Algeria’s RRF, Libya’s LIA, and UAE’s ADIC remain very non-
transparent, with low or non-existent LM scores. Oman’s SGRF, Qatar’s QIA, and Abu Dhabi’s 
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ADIA have reached a score of at least 4 or 5. Kuwait’s KIA has reached a score of 6, while 
several of the smaller and newer SWFs (such as those of Bahrain’s Mumtalakat), and both 
UAE’s Mubadala and IPIC have achieved high LM scores approaching those of Norway.  
 Table 3 identifies several clear differences in the allocation of SWF investments across 
firms in different regions of the world. Funds from the GCC are more likely to invest in Western 
countries and MENA, but less likely to invest in Asia and LAC and SSA. These patterns are 
especially strong in the case of ADIA and KIA. SAMA’s investment allocation pattern is quite 
the opposite, though in recent years the pattern reverts to those of other MENA SWFs. More 
transparent funds have been more likely to invest in firms in Western countries, but less in Asian 
firms. Acquisitions involving multiple acquirers have been less likely to occur in Western 
countries, and more likely in Asian countries.  
 Table 4 identifies several distinct patterns in the tendencies of SWFs to invest in certain 
types of sectors. Older and larger SWFs have been more likely to invest in Strategic, Industry 
sectors, and Technology sectors. More transparent SWFs are more likely to Invest in Social 
Sectors such as education and health. After controlling for those SWF characteristics, ADIA 
appears more likely to invest in Industry, and KIA less likely to invest in either Strategic or 
Technology sectors. Among GCC SWFs, those in which representatives from elite families 
(Family) appear to play prominent roles tend to invest less in Social sectors and more in 
Technology. By contrast, GCC funds in which foreigners play a more prominent role invest more 
in both Social and Industry sectors.  
 Table 5 delves somewhat deeper into the allocations of SWF investments within MENA 
countries and the different sectors of target companies, showing the relevance of various SWF 
characteristics such as size (AUM), Age, joint venture status (MA), and LM Index. Whereas the 
LM index of the SWF matters in almost all outcome variables, the Investment Profile Index 
matters only for investments in the Industrial sector. In this case the relationship is negative. 
While higher scores on the Corruption Index do raise the likelihood that MENA countries will 
receive an SWF investment (especially in the Strategic industry), in both cases, the significance 
levels of these relations are rather weak (significant only at the 10 percent level). 
 Finally, Table 6 identifies some significant factors related to the size of the individual 
investment transactions. Among SWF characteristics, funds which were larger and which 
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invested in the form of joint ventures made larger individual investments, whereas those which 
were older (and, perhaps, had higher LM scores) seemed to make smaller investments. 
Investment in Social and Finance Sectors tended to be larger, while investments in Industry and, 
perhaps, also Technology sectors tended to be smaller. Beyond this, certain individual SWFs 
(such as ADIA) tend to make smaller investments, while others (such as UAE’s IPIC) tend to 
make larger ones.  
 With respect to the relatively limited literature touching on the aforementioned 
relationships, especially in the GCC context, the most important conclusions are the following: 
(1) The transparency of the individual SWFs is significantly related to all three outcome 
measures studied: allocations of investments in firms by country and region; allocations of 
investments in firms by sector; and the dollar size (in natural logs) of the individual 
investments, indicating that fund transparency tends to have greater influence than the 
country-level governance indexes that have been employed in the previous literature. 
(2) While the age of the SWF plays only a relatively minor role in the choice of geographic 
destination of its investments, SWF age plays a stronger role in the sectoral allocations 
(older SWFs invest more in Strategic, Industry and Technology Sectors). From Table 5, 
moreover, older funds also make their investments in smaller amounts.  
(3) Likewise, investments with multiple acquirers (MA) are of course more complicated and are 
likely to involve larger transaction amounts. These transactions seem to be more prominent 
in Asia and LAC and SSA where financial markets may not be as well developed and 
information on individual target firms is less complete, making these transactions riskier. 
Notably, the risk-reducing benefits of MA may also allow the investing SWFs to make 
investments that are larger (as shown in Table 5). 
(4) The results in Tables 3-5 show that different SWFs in the GCC behave somewhat differently 
in a number of different respects and, moreover, those in Table 4 show that the compositions 
of their decision-making boards may play a part in the funds’ choice of sector or functional 
types in which to invest. In particular, those SWFs in which foreigners or local elites seem to 
be more numerous tend to invest differently than other SWFs. 
 
Topics in Middle Eastern and African Economies 
Proceedings of Middle East Economic Association 
Vol. 21, Issue No. 1, May 2019  
 
18 
 
In view of some of the collinearity among explanatory variables, and in many cases their 
endogeneity and the relatively weak explanatory power the models presented, further research to 
deal with these shortcomings is clearly needed. Steps in this direction could include investigating 
the direction of causality, using simultaneous equations models, and applying panel data 
methods.  
Finally, even though the present findings should be considered very tentative, two 
mechanisms appear useful in facilitating investments by SWFs into geographic or functional 
areas of their choice for policy purposes. The results are at least suggestive that those SWFs with 
higher LM scores have been able to invest in firms in Western countries, despite the great fears 
that had been expressed in the West during and after the world financial crisis, and perhaps also 
in LAC and SSA where they may be much less known. Similarly, especially for investments in 
MENA, GCC SWFs with greater transparency appear to have been able to invest more in Social 
Sectors which relate rather clearly and directly to the steps needed to abide by Hartwick’s Rule. 
These investments could promote the development of the human capital that will be needed to 
achieve greater diversification of economies away from oil. 
 
 
Table 1: Large Sample of Sovereign Wealth Funds and their Assets in Billions of US Dollars by Year 
Name of the SWF and their 
nature (Commodity or Not) 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Algeria Revenue Regulation Fund, 
2000 (Oil) (RRF) $47.0 $47.0 $54.8 $56.7 $56.7 $77.2 $77.2 $50.0 $50.0 
Angola Fundo Soberano de Angola, 
2012 (Oil)     $5.0 $5.0 $5.0 $5.0 $5.0 
Angola Reserve Fund for Oil, 2007 
(Oil) $0.2         
Australian Future Fund, 2004 (Non-
commodity) $58.5 $40.4 $59.1 $76.2 $80.0 $88.7 $90.2 $95.0 $95.0 
Australia Western Future Fund, 2012 
(Minerals)      $0.3 $0.3 $0.3 $0.3 
Azerbaijan State Oil Fund, 1999 (Oil) $3.3 $10.2 $21.7 $30.2 $30.2 $32.7 $36.6 $37.3 $37.3 
Bahrain Mumtalakat Holding 
Company, 2006 (Oil) $2.6 $14.0 $9.1 $11.3 $9.1 $7.1 $10.5 $10.5 $10.6 
Bolivia FINPRO, 2012 (Non-
Commodity)        $1.2 $1.2 
Botswana Pula Fund, 1994 
(Diamonds and Minerals) $6.9 $6.9 $6.9 $6.9 $6.9 $6.9 $6.9 $6.9 $5.7 
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Brazil Sovereign Fund, 2008 (Non-
commodity) $5.9 $8.6 $8.6 $11.3 $11.3 $5.3 $5.3 $5.3 $0.5 
Brunei Investment Agency, 1983 
(Oil) $30.0 $30.0 $30.0 $30.0 $30.0 $30.0 $40.0 $40.0 $40.0 
Canada Alberta's Heritage Fund, 
1976 (Oil) $16.6 $14.9 $13.8 $14.4 $15.9 $16.4 $16.4 $17.5 $17.5 
Chile Social and Economic 
Stabilization Fund, 1985 (Copper)  $15.5 $21.3 $21.8 $21.8 $15.0 $15.0 $15.2 $15.2 $15.2 
Chile Pension Reserve Fund, 2006 
(Copper)      $5.7 $15.0 $7.0 $7.9 $7.9 
China Investment Corporation, 2007 
(Non-commodity)  
$200.
0 
$200.
0 
$288.
8 
$409.
6 
$439.
6 
$482.
0 
$575.
2 
$746.
7 
$813.
8 
China National Social Security Fund, 
2000 (Non-commodity) $74.0 $82.4 
$146.
5 
$146.
5 
$134.
5 
$160.
6 
$181.
0 
$236.
0 
$236.
0 
China SAFE Investment Company, 
1997 (Non-commodity) 
$311.
6 
$347.
1 
$347.
1 
$347.
1 
$567.
9 
$567.
9 
$567.
9 
$567.
9 
$474.
0 
China-Africa Development Fund, 
2007 (Non-commodity) $5.0 $5.0 $5.0 $5.0 $5.0 $5.0 $5.0 $5.0 $5.0 
Equatorial Guinea Fund for Future 
Generations, 2002 (Oil)     $0.1 $0.1 $0.1 $0.1 $0.1 
France Strategic Investment Fund, 
2008 (Fiscal Surplus)  $28.0 $28.0 $28.0 $28.0 $25.5 $25.5 $25.5  
Gabon Sovereign Wealth Fund, 1998 
(Oil)     $0.4 $0.4 $0.4 $0.4 $0.4 
Ghana Petroleum Funds, 2011 (Oil)    $0.1 $0.1 $0.1 $0.1 $0.5 $0.5 
Hong Kong Monetary Authority 
Investment Portfolio, 1993 (Non-
commodity) 
$163.
0 
$193.
4 
$227.
6 
$292.
3 
$292.
3 
$298.
7 
$326.
7 
$400.
2 
$442.
4 
Indonesia Government Investment 
Unit, 2006 (Non-commodity)  $0.3 $0.3 $0.3 $0.3 $0.3 $0.3 $0.3 $0.3 
Iran National Development Fund for 
Iran, 1999 (Oil & Gas) $12.9 $13.0 $23.0 $23.0 $40.0 $49.6 $58.6 $62.0 $62.0 
Iraq Development Fund for Iraq, 
2003 (Oil)      $18.0 $18.0 $18.0 $0.9 
Ireland National Pensions Reserve 
Fund, 2001 (Non-commodity) $30.8 $22.8 $33.0 $33.0 $17.5 $19.4 $19.4 $27.4 $23.5 
Italian Strategic Fund, 2011 (Non-
commodity)    $1.4 $1.4 $1.4 $6.0 $6.0  
Kazakhstan National Fund, 2000 
(Oil) $21.5 $38.0 $38.0 $38.6 $58.2 $61.8 $68.9 $77.0 $77.0 
Kazakhstan Samruk-Kazyana JSC, 
2008 (Non-commodity)      $77.5 $77.5 $77.5 $69.3 
Kazakhstan National Investment 
Corporation, 2012 (Oil)      $20.0 $20.0 $2.0 $2.0 
Kiribati Revenue Equalization 
Reserve Fund, 1956 (Phosphates) $0.4 $0.4 $0.4 $0.4 $0.4 $0.6 $0.6 $0.6 $0.6 
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Korea Investment Corporation, 2005 
(Non-commodity) $30.0 $27.0 $30.3 $37.0 $43.0 $56.6 $72.0 $84.7 $91.8 
Kuwait Investment Authority, 1953 
(Oil) 
$250.
0 
$202.
8 
$202.
8 
$296.
0 
$296.
0 
$386.
0 
$410.
0 
$548.
0 
$592.
0 
Libyan Investment Authority, 2006 
(Oil) $50.0 $65.0 $65.0 $70.0 $65.0 $65.0 $66.0 $66.0 $66.0 
Malaysia Khazanah National, 1993 
(Non-commodity) $25.7 $23.1 $25.0 $25.0 $36.8 $34.0 $39.1 $41.6 $34.9 
Malaysia Terengganu Investment 
Authority, 2008 (Oil)  $2.8        
Mauritania National Fund for 
Hydrocarbon Reserves, 2006 (Oil & 
Gas) $0.3 $0.3 $0.3 $0.3 $0.3 $0.3 $0.3 $0.3 $0.3 
Mexico Oil Revenues Stabilization 
Fund, 2000 (Oil)    $6.0 $6.0 $6.0 $6.0 $6.0 $6.0 
Mexico Fondo Mexicano del 
Petroleo, 2014 (Oil & Gas)          
Mongolia Fiscal Stabiility Fund, 2011 
(Minerals)     $0.3 $0.3 $0.3 $0.3 $0.3 
New Zealand Superannuation Fund, 
2003 (Non-commodity) $13.8 $9.1 $12.1 $12.1 $15.9 $19.3 $21.8 $21.8 $20.2 
Nigerian Sovereign Investment 
Authority, 2011 (Oil)    $1.0 $1.0 $1.0 $1.5 $1.4 $1.4 
Nigeria Excess Crude Account, 2004 
(Oil)  $11.0 $11.0 $9.4       
Nigeria Bayesla Development and 
Investment Corporation, 2012 (Non-
commodity)        $1.5 $1.5 
Norway Government Pension Fund 
– Global, 1990 (Oil) 
$396.
5 
$396.
6 
$443.
0 
$571.
5 
$611.
0 
$803.
9 
$878.
0 
$882.
0 
$885.
0 
Oman State General Reserve Fund, 
1980 (Oil & Gas) $2.0 $8.2 $8.2 $8.2 $8.2 $8.2 $13.0 $13.0 $34.0 
Oman Investment Fund, 2006 (Oil)       $6.0 $6.0 $6.0 
Palestine Investment Fund, 2003 
(Non-commodity)     $0.8 $0.8 $0.8 $0.8 $0.8 
Panama Fondo de Ahorro de 
Panama, 2012 (Non-commodity)      $0.3 $0.3 $1.2 $1.2 
Papua New Guinea Sovereign 
Wealth Fund, 2011 (Gas)          
Peru Fiscal Stabilization Fund, 1999 
(Non-commodity)     $7.1 $7.1 $7.1 $7.1 $9.2 
Qatar Investment Authority, 2003 
(Oil) $60.0 $65.0 $65.0 $85.0 
$100.
0 
$115.
0 
$170.
0 
$256.
0 
$335.
0 
Russia National Welfare Fund, 2008 
(Oil)  
$162.
5 
$178.
5 
$142.
5 
$142.
5 
$149.
7 
$175.
5 $88.0 $79.9 $73.5 
Russia Reserve Fund, 2008 (Oil)       $86.4 $86.4 $88.9 $65.7 
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Russian Direct Investment Fund, 
2011 (Non-commodity)      $11.5 $13.0 $13.0 $13.0 
Saudi Arabia SAMA Foreign 
Holdings, 1952 (Oil)  
$300.
0 
$431.
0 
$415.
0 
$472.
5 
$532.
8 
$675.
9 
$737.
6 
$757.
2 
$598.
4 
Saudi Arabia Public Investment 
Fund, 2008 (Oil) $5.3 $5.3 $5.3 $5.3 $5.3 $5.3 $5.3 $5.3 
$160.
0 
Senegal FONSIS, 2012 (Non-
commodity)       $1.0 $1.0 $1.0 
Singapore Government Investment 
Corporation, 1981 (Non-commodity) 
$330.
0 
$247.
5 
$247.
5 
$247.
5 
$247.
5 
$285.
0 
$320.
0 
$320.
0 
$350.
0 
Singapore Temasek Holdings, 1974 
(Non-Commodity) 
$159.
0 
$134.
0 
$122.
0 
$157.
2 
$157.
2 
$173.
3 
$173.
3 
$177.
0 
$193.
6 
Timor-Leste Petroleum Fund, 2005 
(Oil & Gas) $3.0 $4.2 $5.0 $6.3 $9.9 $13.6 $15.7 $16.6 $16.9 
Trinidad and Tobago Heritage and 
Stabilization Fund, 2000 (Oil) $0.5 $2.9 $2.9 $2.9 $2.9 $5.0 $5.0 $5.5 $5.5 
Turkmenistan Stabilization Fund, 
2008 (Oil & Gas)          
UAE Mubadala Development 
Company, 2002 (Oil) $10.0 $14.7 $13.3 $13.3 $48.2 $55.5 $60.9 $66.3 $66.3 
UAE International Petroleum 
Investment Company, 1984 (Oil)  $14.0 $14.0 $58.0 $58.0 $65.3 $65.3 $68.4 $66.3 
UAE Abu Dhabi Investment 
Authority & Council, 1976 (Oil) 
$875.
0 
$627.
0 
$627.
0 
$627.
0 
$627.
0 
$627.
0 
$863.
0 
$863.
0 
$902.
0 
UAE Abu Dhabi Investment 
Council, 2007 (Oil)       $90.0 $90.0 
$110.
0 
UAE Dubai Investment Corporation 
of Dubai, 2006 (Oil) $82.0 $82.0 $19.6 $19.6 $70.0 $70.0 $70.0 $70.0 
$196.
0 
UAE Ras Al Khaimah RAK 
Investment Authority, 2005 (Oil) $1.2 $1.2 $1.2 $1.2 $1.2 $1.2 $1.2 $1.2 $1.2 
UAE Federal Emirates Investment 
Authority, 2007 (Oil)       $15.0 $15.0 $15.0 
USA Alabama Trust Fund, 1985 (Oil 
& Gas) $3.1 $3.1 $3.1 $3.1 $2.5 $2.5 $2.5 $2.5 $2.5 
USA Alaska Permanent Fund, 1976 
(Oil) $39.8 $29.0 $35.5 $40.3 $42.3 $46.8 $51.7 $52.8 $53.9 
USA Louisiana Education Quality 
Trust Fund, 1986 (Oil & Gas)      $1.1 $1.1 $1.1 $1.3 
USA New Mexico State Investment 
Council, 1958 (Oil & Gas) $16.0 $11.7 $12.9 $13.8 $14.3 $16.3 $18.4 $19.8 $19.8 
USA North Dakota Legacy Fund, 
2011 (Oil & Gas)     $0.1 $1.3 $1.7 $2.4 $3.2 
USA Texas Permanent School Fund, 
1854 (Oil & other)    $24.4 $25.5 $25.5 $30.3 $37.7 $37.7 
USA Texas Permanent University 
Fund, 1876 (Oil & Gas)      $14.4 $15.3 $17.2 $17.2 
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USA Utah SITFO, 1896 (Land and 
Mineral Royalties) $0.7 $0.9 $0.8 $1.0 $1.2 $1.3 $1.5 $1.8 $2.0 
USA West Virginia Future Fund, 
2014 (Oil & Gas)          
USA Wyoming Permanent Mineral 
Trust Fund, 1974 (Minerals) $3.7 $3.6 $3.6 $4.7 $4.7 $5.6 $5.6 $5.6 $5.6 
Venezuela FIEM Macroeconomic 
Stabilization Fund, 1998 (Oil) $0.8 $0.8 $0.8 $0.8 $0.8 $0.8 $0.8 $0.8 $0.8 
Vietnam State Capital Investment 
Corporation, 2006 (Non-commodity)  $2.1 $0.5 $0.5 $0.5 $0.5 $0.5 $0.5 $0.5 $0.5 
          
Total 
$3,83
9 
$3,72
6 
$3,89
7 
$4,53
8 
$5,04
4 
$5,95
8 
$6,69
3 
$7,26
3 
$7,55
8 
 
 
Table 2: Large Sample of SWFs and their Scores on the Linaburg-Maduell SWF Transparency Index   
(1 (low) -10 (high) 2008-2016) 
Name of SWF  2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Algeria Revenue Regulation Fund, 2000 
(Oil) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Angola Fundo Soberano de Angola, 2012 
(Oil)         8 
Angola Reserve Fund for Oil, 2007 (Oil) 1         
Australian Future Fund, 2004 (Non-
commodity) 9 9 9 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Australia Western Future Fund, 2012 
(Minerals)          
Azerbaijan State Oil Fund, 1999 (Oil) 9 9 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Bahrain Mumtalakat Holding Company, 
2006 (Oil) 6 7 7 8 8 9 9 9 10 
Bolivia FINPRO, 2012 (Non-
Commodity)          
Botswana Pula Fund, 1994 (Diamonds 
and Minerals) 3 1 1 1 6 6 6 6 6 
Brazil Sovereign Fund, 2008 (Non-
commodity)  9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 
Brunei Investment Agency, 1983 (Oil) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Canada Alberta's Heritage Fund, 1976 
(Oil) 8 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 
Chile Social and Economic Stabilization 
Fund, 1985 (Copper)  3 7 9 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Chile Pension Reserve Fund, 2006 
(Copper)       10 10 10 10 
China Investment Corporation, 2007 
(Non-commodity)  2 6 6 7 7 7 7 8 8 
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China National Social Security Fund, 2000 
(Non-commodity) 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
China SAFE Investment Company, 1997 
(Non-commodity) 2 2 2 2 4 4 4 4 4 
China-Africa Development Fund, 2007 
(Non-commodity)  4 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 
Equatorial Guinea Fund for Future 
Generations, 2002 (Oil)          
France Strategic Investment Fund, 2008 
(Fiscal Surplus)  9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 
Gabon Sovereign Wealth Fund, 1998 
(Oil)          
Ghana Petroleum Funds, 2011 (Oil)          
Hong Kong Monetary Authority 
Investment Portfolio, 1993 (Non-
commodity) 7 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 
Indonesia Government Investment Unit, 
2006 (Non-commodity)          
Iran National Development Fund for 
Iran, 1999 (Oil & Gas) 2 1 1 1 1 5 5 5 5 
Iraq Development Fund for Iraq, 2003 
(Oil)          
Ireland National Pensions Reserve Fund, 
2001 (Non-commodity) 7 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Italian Strategic Fund, 2011 (Non-
commodity)          
Kazakhstan National Fund, 2000 (Oil) 3 6 6 6 6 8 2 8 2 
Kazakhstan Samruk-Kazyana JSC, 2008 
(Non-commodity)          
Kazakhstan National Investment 
Corporation, 2012 (Oil)          
Kiribati Revenue Equalization Reserve 
Fund, 1956 (Phosphates) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Korea Investment Corporation, 2005 
(Non-commodity) 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 
Kuwait Investment Authority, 1953 (Oil) 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 
Libyan Investment Authority, 2006 (Oil) 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 
Malaysia Khazanah National, 1993 (Non-
commodity) 7 4 4 4 5 5 5 9 9 
Malaysia Terengganu Investment 
Authority, 2008 (Oil)          
Mauritania National Fund for 
Hydrocarbon Reserves, 2006 (Oil & Gas) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Mexico Oil Revenues Stabilization Fund, 
2000 (Oil)     4 4 4 4 4 
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Mexico Fondo Mexicano del Petroleo, 
2014 (Oil & Gas)          
Mongolia Fiscal Stabiility Fund, 2011 
(Minerals)          
New Zealand Superannuation Fund, 2003 
(Non-commodity) 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Nigerian Sovereign Investment Authority, 
2011 (Oil)       4 9 9 
Nigeria Excess Crude Account, 2004 (Oil)  1 1 1 1      
Nigeria Bayesla Development and 
Investment Corporation, 2012 (Non-
commodity)          
Norway Government Pension Fund – 
Global, 1990 (Oil) 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Oman State General Reserve Fund, 1980 
(Oil & Gas) 2 1 1 1 1 1 4 4 4 
Oman Investment Fund, 2006 (Oil)       4 4 4 
Palestine Investment Fund, 2003 (Non-
commodity)          
Panama Fondo de Ahorro de Panama, 
2012 (Non-commodity)          
Papua New Guinea Sovereign Wealth 
Fund, 2011 (Gas)          
Peru Fiscal Stabilization Fund, 1999 
(Non-commodity)          
Qatar Investment Authority, 2003 (Oil) 1 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Russia National Welfare Fund, 2008 (Oil)  5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Russia Reserve Fund, 2008 (Oil)        5 5 5 
Russian Direct Investment Fund, 2011 
(Non-commodity)          
Saudi Arabia SAMA Foreign Holdings, 
1952 (Oil)  4 2 2 2 4 4 4 4 4 
Saudi Arabia Public Investment Fund, 
2008 (Oil) 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 
Senegal FONSIS, 2012 (Non-commodity)          
Singapore Government Investment 
Corporation, 1981 (Non-commodity) 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 
Singapore Temasek Holdings, 1974 (Non-
Commodity) 7 8 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Timor-Leste Petroleum Fund, 2005 (Oil 
& Gas) 7 6 6 6 8 8 8 8 8 
Trinidad and Tobago Heritage and 
Stabilization Fund, 2000 (Oil) 5 5 5 5 8 8 8 8 8 
Turkmenistan Stabilization Fund, 2008 
(Oil & Gas)          
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UAE Mubadala Development Company, 
2002 (Oil) 6 7 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
UAE International Petroleum Investment 
Company, 1984 (Oil)     3 9 9 9 9 
UAE Abu Dhabi Investment Authority & 
Council, 1976 (Oil) 3 3 3 3 5 5 5 6 6 
UAE Abu Dhabi Investment Council, 
2007 (Oil)          
UAE Dubai Investment Corporation of 
Dubai, 2006 (Oil) 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 
UAE Ras Al Khaimah RAK Investment 
Authority, 2005 (Oil) 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
UAE Federal Emirates Investment 
Authority, 2007 (Oil) 1 1 1 2 2 2 3 3 3 
USA Alabama Trust Fund, 1985 (Oil & 
Gas)       9 9 9 
USA Alaska Permanent Fund, 1976 (Oil) 9 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
USA Louisiana Education Quality Trust 
Fund, 1986 (Oil & Gas)          
USA New Mexico State Investment 
Council, 1958 (Oil & Gas) 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 
USA North Dakota Legacy Fund, 2011 
(Oil & Gas)          
USA Texas Permanent School Fund, 1854 
(Oil & other)        9 9 
USA Texas Permanent University Fund, 
1876 (Oil & Gas)          
USA Utah SITFO, 1896 (Land and 
Mineral Royalties)          
USA West Virginia Future Fund, 2014 
(Oil & Gas)          
USA Wyoming Permanent Mineral Trust 
Fund, 1974 (Minerals) 8 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 
Venezuela FIEM Macroeconomic 
Stabilization Fund, 1998 (Oil) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Vietnam State Capital Investment 
Corporation, 2006 (Non-commodity)  4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
 
Table 3: Investment Allocations by Geographic Region 
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Western Countries LAC & SSA
Explanatory Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
AUM 0.247 -1.298 1.02 1.3 *** 1.296 0.473 0.942 -9.951 *** 1.666
s.e. 0.376 0.928 2.216 0.464 0.958 1.285 2.12 1.453 3.426
GCC 2.564 *** 0.332 0.78 -3.583 *** -1.178 -1.944 * -0.204
s.e. 0.326 0.754 0.936 0.378 0.836 1.04 1.029
Age 0.0002 0.0038 0.016 0.0288 *** 0.018 0.004 -0.051 ** -0.089
s.e. 0.0053 0.0177 0.019 0.006 0.018 0.019 0.025 0.093
LM 0.4239 *** 0.165 * 0.264 ** -0.662 *** -0.239 ** -0.33 *** 0.493 ** -0.304 *** -0.241
s.e. 0.0644 0.089 0.115 0.072 0.099 0.127 0.237 0.115 0.181
MA -1.211 *** -0.881 *** -0.655 *** 1.165 *** 0.856 *** 0.625 ** 0.756 -1.637 ** -0.958
s.e. 0.208 0.24 0.249 -0.231 0.252 0.266 0.872 0.83 0.862
ADIA 2.622 *** 2.929 *** -1.747 * -1.936 4.487 *
s.e. 0.888 1.121 0.957 1.211 2.818
KIA 2.807 *** 10.74 *** -2.297 ** -12.36 *** -0.549
s.e. 1.007 1.899 1.028 2.192 4.444
TEMASEK -0.525 0.187 -0.435 -0.677
s.e. 0.644 1.075 0.687 1.176
SAMA -0.047 -4.224 *** 0.305 4.918 ***
s.e. 1.039 1.413 1.063 1.445
MUBAD -0.372 -126.7
s.e. 1.26 10662
IPIC -0.808 -1.878 -0.555 1.381 2.922
s.e. 0.992 2.678 1.353 3.378 2.244
QIA 0.835 1.612 -0.185 -0.76 -1.308
s.e. 0.744 1.071 0.852 1.255 0.929
TIME* KIA -1.402 *** 1.684 ***
0.206 0.245
TIME*ADIA -0.333 *** 0.296 **
0.115 0.119
TIME*MUBAD 15.61
1240
TIME*IPIC 0.155 -0.239
0.443 0.716
TIME*QIA -0.146 0.163
0.133 0.152
TIME*SAMA 0.438 *** -0.529 ***
0.131 0.134
TIME*TEMASEK -0.196 0.13
0.159 0.169
TIME 0.224 **
0.105
Constant -3.093 *** -0.78 -2.343 ** 2.924 *** 0.359 1.783 * -6.334 *** -0.136 1.383
s.e. 0.525 0.667 0.982 0.529 0.688 0.99 2.335 0.692 1.172
Number of Observations 1446 1446 1419 1446 1441 1415 1446 1446 1232
Pseudo R2 0.155 0.289 0.332 0.137 0.203 0.315 0.26 0.308 0.427
Asian Countries MENA
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Table 4: Investment Allocations by Type and Function 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Strategic Social Industry Technology Finance
Explanatory Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Age 0.056 *** 0.009 0.026 ** 0.071 *** -0.009 0.028 0.333 *** 0.061 ** 0.049 0.011
s.e. 0.015 0.024 0.017 0.026 0.009 0.03 0.106 0.031 0.045 0.024
LM -0.06 0.373 ** -0.021 0.02 -0.076 -0.05 -0.666 ** 0.132 0.047 0.045
se. 0.127 0.177 0.101 0.198 0.077 0.146 0.329 0.141 0.207 0.101
Relative Size 0.022 ** -0.233 0.026 ** -0.65 0.005 0.019 0.079 0.026 ** -0.173 -0.002
se. 0.011 0.249 0.01 0.581 0.006 0.012 0.088 0.01 0.467 0.012
QIA -0.818 .. 0.342 .. 0.322
se. 1.223 .. 0.83 .. 0.463
ADIA -0.531 0.814 0.582 ** -0.817 0.181
se. 0.534 0.535 0.289 0.578 0.225
KIA -1.429 *** -0.1 0.026 -2.31 *** 0.367
se. 0.348 0.664 0.322 0.493 0.293
TEMASEK 0.463 -0.414 -0.634 0.955 1.519 ***
se. 0.814 0.994 0.901 1.155 0.529
Royalty -0.878 0.807 0.941
se. 1.558 1.287 1.003
Family 1.615 *** -2.043 * 0.557 2.634 *** 0.104
se 0.448 1.202 0.425 0.613 0.368
Foreigner 0.005 0.121 *** 0.025 ** 0.017 0.007
se. 0.013 0.038 0.012 0. 019 0.01
Constant -3.703 *** -5.733 *** 3.045 *** -5.177 *** -0.846 -3.704 -21.003 *** -6.408 *** -6.663 * -2.477
se. 1.181 1.869 0.927 2.052 0.653 2.359 5.839 2.09 3.513 1.724
Number of Observations 1420 1368 1420 1368 1420 1301 1247 1301 1247 1301
Pseudo R2 0.071 0.086 0.017 0.131 0.062 0.074 0.038 0.013 0.129 0.003
Strategic Social Industry Technology Finance 
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Table 5: The Relative Importance of Country-Level Governance and SWF Transparency in Geographic and Functional Allocations of SWF 
Investments 
MENA Countries Strategic Social Industry Finance Technology
Explanatory Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 12 11 12
AUM 9.629 *** 9.851 ***
se. 1.67 1.866
Relative Size 0.022 ** 0.022 ** -0.536 -0.507 0.015 * 0.016 * 0.006 0.006 -0.249 -0.109
se. 0.009 0.01 0.389 0.391 0.008 0.009 0.008 0.008 0.305 0.233
Age 0.048 *** 0.052 *** -0.012 -0.009 0.012 ** 0.017 ** -0.007 * -0.01 0.064 ** 0.076 ***
se. 0.009 0.012 0.01 0.012 0.005 0.007 0.004 0.005 0.012 0.018
MA -2.672 * -2.04 *
se. 1.37 1.233
LM -0.641 *** -0.637 *** -0.224 *** -0.376 *** 0.192 0.174 -0.123 * -0.114 0.042 0.048 -0.231 ** -0.549 ***
se. 0.19 0.196 0.082 0.11 0.1 * 0.117 0.068 0.074 0.05 0.057 0.106 0.144
TIME 0.423 *** 0.203
se. 0.145 0.163
IP 0.363 0.313 *** 0 -0.151 ** -0.003 0.551 ***
se. 0.473 0.098 0.12 0.07 0.061 0.135
CORR 1.422 * 0.453 * 0.083 0.038 -0.03 0.919 **
se. 0.808 0.273 0.283 0.171 0.133 0.397
Constant -3.009 -2.555 -6.49 *** -4.084 *** -3.445 ** -3.716 *** -0.087 -1.956 *** -1.252 * -1.2 ** -10.297 *** -6.405 ***
se. 5.024 2.067 1.333 1.089 1.469 1.138 0.907 0.659 0.738 0.511 1.888 1.664
Number of Observations 1320 1320 1417 1417 1417 1417 1417 1417 1417 1417 1417 1417
Pseudo R2 0.341 0.357 0.048 0.039 0.016 0.016 0.013 0.01 0.003 0.003 0.076 0.057
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Table 6: OLS Estimates of the Relationship between Transactions Value and SWF Characteristics, 
Functions, and Identities 
 
Value Relative to Assets 
Explanatory Variables 1 2 3 4 5
-9.092 *** -9.84 *** -1.073 -0.043 0.512 ***
se. 0.916 0.934 2.303 2.361 0.153
Age -0.11 *** -0.134 *** -0.323 *** -0.217 *** -0.072 ***
s.e. 0.012 0.013 0.043 0.055 0.016
LM 0.524 *** -0.228 0.366 * 0.464 * -0.12 *
se. 0.151 0.17 0.21 0.247 0.065
MA 0.263 0.771 0.03 -0.218 0.905 ***
se. 0.609 0.618 0.627 0.628 0.174
Strategic 2.935 *** 2.949 *** 2.706 *** 2.806 *** 0.291
se. 0.977 0.874 0.962 0.859 0.239
Social 0.41 0.486 0.723 0.706 0.636 ***
se. 0.832 0.829 0.818 0.808 0.226
Industry 1.696 *** 1.7 *** 1.593 *** 1.722 *** -0.29 **
se. 0.502 0.5 0.499 0.488 0.136
Finance 0.854 * 0.843 * 0.703 0.848 * 0.363 ***
se. 0.458 0.456 0.453 0.448 0.125
Technology -2.212 ** -1.958 * -2.513 ** -2.232 ** -0.246
se. 1.117 1.114 1.116 1.112 0.31
FGCC 3.305 *** 9.83 *** 17.152 *** -0.281
se. 0.89 1.398 2.455 0.729
KIA -0.452 -12.03 *** 0.701
se. 0.934 3.216 0.879
QIA -8.29 *** -14.48 *** 0.769
se. 1.762 2.441 0.754
ADIA -7.803 *** -17.48 *** -2.678 ***
se. 1.273 2.68 0.79
TEMASEK 5.594 *** 4.5 *** 1.85 ***
se. 1.863 1.951 0.491
SAMA -12.97 *** 1.258
se. 3.276 0.921
IPIC -1.437 3.673 ***
se. 3.273 0.894
PIF -15.31 *** 2.911
se. 6.951 1.931
MUBAD -17.68 *** 1.031
se. 4.042 1.164
Constant 12.602 *** 9.333 *** 11.796 *** 9.962 *** 3.363 ***
se. 1.171 1.461 1.807 1.915 0.763
Number of Observations 1420 1420 1420 1420 1420
Pseudo R2 0.128 0.131 0.162 0.185 0.387
AUM
Absolute Value 
(in Natural 
logs) 
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